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Electronic surveillance for healthcare-associated infections (HAIs) is increasingly widespread. This is driven by multiple factors: a greater
burden on hospitals to provide surveillance data to state and national agencies, financial pressures to be more efficient with HAI surveillance,
the desire for more objective comparisons between healthcare facilities, and the increasing amount of patient data available electronically.
Optimal implementation of electronic surveillance requires that specific information be available to the surveillance systems. This white
paper reviews different approaches to electronic surveillance, discusses the specific data elements required for performing surveillance, and
considers important issues of data validation.
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purpose
Surveillance for healthcare-associated infections (HAIs) is a
cornerstone of infection prevention. To be useful, such sur-
veillance must use standard definitions that can be applied
consistently over time and between locations and that reflect
conditions that can be prevented through improvement ef-
forts. Surveillance definitions are distinct from clinical
diagnostic criteria: surveillance definitions are for trending
and benchmarking, whereas clinical definitions are for treat-
ment and prognosis.1 Traditional surveillance systems for HAI
are labor intensive, can miss a substantial number of infec-
tions, and are prone to high interobserver variability.2,3 With
the introduction of electronic health records (EHRs), elec-
tronic assistance for infection preventionists (IPs) is becom-
ing increasingly common, especially for case finding.4
Before beginning electronic surveillance for HAI, there are
important considerations as to what data should be included
in EHRs and how the data should be structured. There are
also important gaps in the current knowledge of how best to
implement electronic surveillance systems. This white paper
is intended to present an overview of different approaches to
electronic surveillance and to provide a comprehensive de-
scription of the required data elements. It is intended pri-
marily for IPs and hospital epidemiologists, to guide them
toward building systems to capture the data elements they
will need for electronic surveillance, and for healthcare in-
formaticists and hospital information technology (IT) pro-
fessionals, to help them understand why certain discrete el-
ements are needed for infection prevention purposes.
background
Researchers at LDS Hospital in Salt Lake City, Utah, published
a pioneering report in 1986 that described a computer system
capable of using microbiology laboratory data to identify pa-
tients with possible HAIs.5 Despite the passage of almost 3
decades since then, only a minority of hospitals are currently
using electronic surveillance systems.6 The terms “data min-
ing,” “automated surveillance,” “surveillance technology,”
and “electronic surveillance” are often used interchangeably
to describe infection control surveillance software systems.
There is, however, an important distinction: some programs
assist the IP in performing surveillance (which we term semi-
automated electronic surveillance), and some systems con-
duct surveillance entirely independent of IP involvement
(fully automated electronic surveillance). Fully automated
surveillance systems can still include some manual steps (eg,
an IP may enter a patient’s ventilator fraction of inspired
oxygen [FiO2] into a software system manually). The key
distinction is whether the determination that an HAI is
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present is decided solely by an objective computer algorithm
rather than by an IP manually reviewing raw data.
The vast majority of programs in use by infection preven-
tion programs today are semi-automated electronic surveil-
lance systems in which the user must still make the ultimate
call at to whether an HAI is present. The LDS system de-
scribed above is one such example: the user receives alerts of
interest but must perform additional tasks (eg, medical record
review) to classify an alert as an HAI. Semi-automated elec-
tronic surveillance systems filter vast amounts of data from
laboratory, pharmacy, and admission/discharge/transfer
(ADT) systems. They require substantial user input and do
not replace the need for chart review. This type of system is
valuable in reducing the amount of time IPs need to spend
on surveillance, but it is still subject to differences in case
finding as a consequence of human factors. An ideal semi-
automated electronic surveillance has a very high negative
predictive value (ie, reliably eliminates from consideration
cultures from patients who do not have HAIs) and reasonable
specificity so as to make surveillance as efficient as possible.7
Research groups using different semi-automated electronic
surveillance strategies have reported sensitivities ranging from
0.65 to 0.94 and specificities ranging from 0.72 to 0.99. The
impact of semi-automated electronic surveillance systems on
patient outcomes has not been formally assessed; however,
60% of respondents in a recent survey reported improved
patient outcomes since adopting semi-automated electronic
surveillance.8,9
By contrast, fully automated electronic surveillance systems
are less well described. They function autonomously through
a more complex series of algorithms to determine which pa-
tients likely have specific HAIs. These systems perform sur-
veillance in its entirety and do not require IP case review.
Trick et al10 first described successful automation of central
line–associated bloodstream infection (CLABSI) surveillance
through an in-house developed algorithm in 2004. Several
years later, the scalability of this algorithm was demonstrated
at 4 medical centers.11 Subsequently, the authors have made
all information, including the algorithm, available free to the
public (http://bsi.cchil.org/index.html). A similar system that
is able to capture data on central venous catheter (CVC) use
electronically has been implemented at a large Midwestern
health system.12 Analogous systems have also been con-
structed for automated notifiable disease detection and re-
porting,13 and systems incorporating diagnosis codes have
been described.14,15
basic considerations
Most HAI surveillance criteria, like those developed by the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) National
Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN), include clinical signs and
symptoms (eg, fever and suprapubic tenderness), medical
procedure details (eg, duration of surgery), and medical de-
vice exposure data (eg, ventilator) in addition to laboratory
and microbiological test results. The success of electronic HAI
surveillance therefore often depends on the accuracy, con-
sistency, and timeliness of data on these signs and exposures.
Strategies to improve the quality of data collection include
minimizing free text data entry and streamlining documen-
tation into highly structured, discrete fields. In addition, cul-
tivating an institutional culture that embraces technology and
views change positively is also likely to improve data quality.16
Denominator Capture
An essential component of expressing accurate infection rates
is valid enumeration of at-risk patients, procedures, and/or
days. There are underappreciated complexities to this process.
For example, for surgical site infections (SSIs), these denom-
inator data are derived from the number of procedures. Ac-
curate assessment of these data may be a challenge because
of competing coding systems (eg, current procedural ter-
minology [CPT] vs International Classification of Diseases, 9th
Revision [ICD-9], codes) that lack a 1 : 1 mapping. Another
example is device-related infections, for which denominators
are expressed in terms of “device-days.” For CLABSI, the
current standard is to tally 1 device-day if any CVC is present
in a patient, regardless of how many lines are present. For
manual surveillance, the count is typically done at the same
time each day. Electronic surveillance could yield different
results, especially if a device-day is tallied using evidence of
the presence of any line in a 24-hour time frame (rather than
at a specific hour of the day, as with a manually tally). To
minimize error, documentation in an EHR needs to be con-
structed to remove ambiguity. For example, rather than sim-
ply selecting a checkbox for “central line yes/no,” the actual
device and anatomic site should be captured as discrete data.
IP involvement in the design of electronic documentation is
critical to the success of accurately and consistently enu-
merating device-days. With adequately detailed records,
programmers can minimize discrepancies between electronic
and manual device counts. In addition, capturing detailed
information on each device will help institutions prepare for
future changes in surveillance definitions (eg, in the future
a patient with 2 catheters in place might count for 2 line-
days, not one). Some devices, namely ventilators, are capable
of electronically transmitting data with precise information
regarding patient exposures. Surveillance systems that are ca-
pable of accepting electronic device data may dramatically
improve the efficiency and accuracy of denominator calcu-
lations. Finally, in determination of device-associated utili-
zation rates, the ability to capture patient-days by unit is an
essential requirement in general.
Numerator Determination
With traditional surveillance, IPs typically consult detailed
bedside records and/or treating clinicians to provide clinical
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context. In contrast, electronic systems make determinations
with relatively sparse data. Although access to the fully clinical
chart and treating clinicians’ impressions is alluring, these
sources can be problematic, because there is the potential for
interinstitutional differences in data availability, differences
in reviewer intensity of record review, biases in finding data
to support a presumed result, and variability in interpreting
the data. Consulting clinicians can be especially perfidious,
because they tend to advocate their subjective clinical gestalt
rather than assessing whether a patient meets formal sur-
veillance definition criteria.
In considering which data elements to include in the nu-
merator for electronic surveillance, one must consider data
availability, data accessibility, and how these additional data
impact accuracy and reliability. Data availability speaks to
whether workflow and electronic documentation processes
are consistent across institutions. For example, blood culture
results are highly available, and their methods of collection
are relatively consistent across institutions. In contrast, cath-
eter tip cultures are highly dependent on local practices and
are thus an example of low data availability. Data accessibility
refers to whether data are stored in an easy-to-access format.
For example, most microbiology data feeds include the or-
ganism as a discrete element. Records that are not readily
computable and rely on processing of text to extract the de-
sired data elements are examples of low-accessibility data.
Discrete Data
Patient information can be captured in EHRs in many ways
and in many locations. To be reliable and effective, electronic
algorithms require discrete data with well-defined meanings.
These data are most readily captured in the EHR by con-
straining the entry choices (eg, by requiring checkboxes [mul-
tiple choices allowed], radio buttons [only a single choice
allowed], or drop down lists). One concern with this ap-
proach, however, is that, by constraining choices, clinically
significant nuances will no longer be captured in the docu-
mentation. This risk can be addressed by allowing the option
of free text notes to accompany discrete data whenever this
makes clinical sense. Natural language processing tools that
can transform complex free text into discrete data are con-
stantly improving and offer promise for the future, but they
are not yet readily available for nonexpert users.
Recommendations
EHRs should be designed to maximize the breadth and flex-
ibility of data export capabilities. Healthcare organizations
should commit to effective change processes during system
implementation to ensure widespread adoption and the re-
sultant potential benefits of more consistent, accurate, and
reliable documentation. The extraction and application of
data, commonly in the form of data warehousing, should be
part of the organization’s commitment to IT.
data needs for electronic hai
surveillance
CLABSI
Much of the initial work on semi-automated electronic sur-
veillance and fully automated electronic surveillance for HAI
has been completed using CLABSI.3,7,10-12 As noted above,
capturing denominator data for CLABSI requires the collec-
tion of the presence of a CVC in a discrete format to deter-
mine “line-days.” In our experience, the workflow for re-
cording the presence of a central line is better suited for daily
accounting rather than enumerating line-days through in-
sertion and removal dates.
For numerator data, the sine qua non for a CLABSI is the
presence of a positive blood culture result. This has become
a relatively easy event to capture electronically. However, the
specific organism must also be captured and compared with
other cultures to assess whether the organism represents a
skin contaminant rather than a pathogen.17 Semi-automated
electronic surveillance and fully automated electronic sur-
veillance systems currently rely on positive cultures of spec-
imens from body sites other than blood to help assess whether
a positive blood culture result represents a secondary infec-
tion.10,12 Because cultures from possible primary sites (eg,
intra-abdominal abscesses) may not be available or may not
have positive results, some secondary BSIs may be incorrectly
classified as CLABSIs. In addition, patients with mucositis
and neutropenia may have translocation of gut microorgan-
isms into the bloodstream,18 leading to incorrect classification
of these bacteremias as CLABSIs. Future surveillance defi-
nitions may take these confounding clinical conditions into
consideration when determining whether a culture represents
a CLABSI. Currently, determining the presence of such con-
ditions from discrete data can be quite difficult. As the main-
tenance of accurate and comprehensive patient problem lists
becomes more accepted as standard practice when docu-
menting care in an EHR, more reliable information may be
available electronically, and incorporating such information
into future algorithms may improve specificity. Semi-auto-
mated electronic surveillance and fully automated electronic
surveillance algorithms intended for widespread use must
consider whether the necessary data elements are widely avail-
able from hospital EHR systems.
Recommendations
The presence of CVCs, including catheter type and anatomic
site, should be documented in a structured manner within
the EHR. Either daily documentation of the presence of the
CVC or insertion and removal dates could be used; the se-
lected method will depend on local workflow and documen-
tation practices. At a minimum, positive microbiology culture
results, including specimen site and species identification (to
the extent performed by the laboratory) and susceptibility
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testing, should also be available and retrievable as discrete
data elements.
As definitions change over time (eg, the recent inclusion
of criteria for a mucosal barrier injury laboratory-confirmed
bloodstream infection), additional information will be re-
quired to realize fully automated electronic surveillance. The
mucosal barrier injury definition requires evaluating whether
a patient received an allogeneic stem cell transplant within
the past year, their white blood cell (WBC) count, and the
presence and severity of graft versus host disease. It will be
a challenge for most systems to electronically capture the data
needed to fully automate the mucosal barrier injury
determination.
Urinary Tract Infection (UTI)
In 2009, NHSN revised the catheter-associated UTI (CAUTI)
definitions to divide UTIs into symptomatic and asymptom-
atic infections.19 Asymptomatic infections without a second-
ary bacteremia are no longer reportable.20 Infection rates are
reported as symptomatic UTIs per 1,000 urinary catheter-
days.
For denominator determination, as with CVC catheter-
days, electronic capture of urinary catheter-days requires un-
ambiguous documentation in the EHR.20,21 To enable semi-
automated electronic surveillance and fully automated
electronic surveillance, patient-level device data is essential,
because only infections in patients with urinary catheters
within defined time frames are subject to the measure. In the
context of CAUTI, the ability to capture patient-days by unit
is not only important from a device utilization measurement
standpoint, but may also become important if alternative
denominators become standard.22
For numerator capture, data elements that describe pa-
tients’ clinical symptoms are essential to apply the NHSN
definitions. These include age, temperature, urgency, fre-
quency, dysuria, suprapubic tenderness, and costovertebral
angle pain or tenderness. For children 1 year of age or youn-
ger, additional data elements are required.19 Although age and
temperature are generally relatively easy data points to capture
in a structured manner, the remaining criteria are more sub-
jective and generally more difficult to extract and interpret
from electronic medical records. Ideally, these data elements
should be part of a nursing assessment and could be docu-
mented as discrete data within assessment flow sheets. Be-
cause of the challenges of using subjective clinical information
in case definition, future definitions of CAUTI may shift away
from subjective elements. In any surveillance system, varia-
tions in practice regarding ordering urinary cultures can have
dramatic effects on reported rates.
Discrete laboratory data elements are also required for al-
gorithmic detection of CAUTIs. These include urine cultures,
leukocyte esterase and nitrate results, microscopic pyuria
(urine specimen with 10 or more WBC/mm3 or 3 or more
WBC/high-power field of unspun urine), and Gram stains.19
Current NHSN criteria do not accept cultures with 3 or more
organisms and require differential symptom assessments de-
pending upon whether the culture has 103 or more or 105 or
more colony-forming units per milliliter.19 Therefore, both
the number of distinct species recovered per culture and the
quantity reported are necessary data elements for algorithmic
identification of CAUTI.
Recommendations
At a minimum, urinary catheter data, quantitative microbi-
ology data, and urinalysis data should be captured discretely
to develop semi-automated electronic surveillance for
CAUTI. Additional work is needed to define more specific
algorithms for semi-automated electronic surveillance or, ide-
ally, fully automated electronic surveillance. To the extent that
subjective symptoms continue to be part of the definition,




NHSN released new surveillance definitions for ventilator-
associated events (VAEs) in January 2013. These new defi-
nitions were designed to overcome many of the weaknesses
of traditional ventilator-associated pneumonia definitions, in-
cluding their complexity, subjectivity, and inaccuracy. The
new definitions shift the focus of surveillance from pneu-
monia alone to complications of mechanical ventilation in
general.23 This shift is a more accurate description of the
diagnostic limitations of routine surveillance, is an oppor-
tunity to broaden the focus of prevention from pneumonia
alone to multiple complications of critical care, and facilitates
simple and objective surveillance definitions that are ame-
nable to automation. Notably, the new definitions do not
include radiographic criteria, because they are difficult to in-
terpret, prone to substantial disagreement between observers,
and difficult to parse electronically.
VAE surveillance begins with identifying patients with
“ventilator-associated conditions” (VACs). VAC is defined as
a sustained increase in ventilator settings after a period of
stable or improving ventilator settings. Additional criteria24
define a subpopulation of VAC as “infection-related VAC”
(IVAC) and further subpopulations of IVAC as “possible
pneumonia” or “probable pneumonia.” VAC and IVAC are
the anchors for the new surveillance paradigm and the only
2 measures that the CDC proposes to be considered for public
reporting.
Recommendations
The new surveillance definitions for VAEs are amenable to
semi-automated electronic surveillance and fully automated
electronic surveillance. To accomplish this, the following data
must be captured in an electronically usable form: daily min-
imum positive expiratory end pressure (PEEP), daily mini-
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table 1. Key Concepts for Describing Data Validation
Validation Description
Internal Active efforts by a reporting facility
to assure completeness and accuracy of
data
External Survey and audit process by external agency
(eg, public health department) to assure
quality of surveillance and reporting
Numerator Primarily performed by external audit, by
sampling candidate patient charts from a
line list of positive microbiologic culture
results
Denominator Primarily performed by internal audit, by
comparing electronically derived device
counts with manual (hand) counts
mum FiO2, daily minimum and maximum temperature, daily
minimum and maximum WBC count, and antibiotic start
and stop dates. To apply the possible and probable ventilator-
associated pneumonia definitions, Gram stain neutrophil and
epithelial cell counts (absolute or semiquantitative), and pul-
monary culture results (quantitative or semiquantitative) are
also necessary. Monthly ventilator-days (device-days) can be
imputed from this data stream as the sum of all daily min-
imum PEEP values per unit per month.
SSI
Unlike denominators for device-related infections, for which
aggregate device data are used, denominators for SSIs require
that specific data elements be gathered at the individual pa-
tient level for all individuals undergoing surgery so that cases
can be appropriately risk adjusted. Although earlier risk ad-
justment used fairly basic data, such as wound class, American
Society of Anesthesiologists score, and duration of surgery,
more recent NHSN risk adjustment models require more
patient information. To submit denominator data electron-
ically, hospitals must format and store these data in a manner
amenable to electronic extraction. Attention must also be paid
to data validity. Although a surgical information system may
capture wound class, operating room (OR) staff may pref-
erentially enter the most common value as the default value
(eg, “clean” for a cardiac procedure) for all cases. Organi-
zations need to clearly define documentation expectations
and procedures to respond to events occurring during the
case that would change the wound class to ensure that this
information is captured.
Because of the complexity in defining SSIs, fully automated
electronic surveillance for numerator capture will be difficult.
However semi-automated electronic surveillance can aid in
case finding and thereby reduce the overall work of surveil-
lance. Combinations of administrative data (codes for SSIs)
plus other data (readmission and antibiotic administration)
are known to improve case finding for SSI.25-29 Although a
positive culture result is not a prerequisite for diagnosing an
SSI, having a wound culture ordered for a postoperative pa-
tient may also be a signal for case finding. Likewise, re-
admission within 30 days of a surgical procedure (or within
90 days of a surgical procedure with an implant) may also
be an indicator of possible infection. Using different algo-
rithms for different kinds of surgical procedures helps to
optimize sensitivity and specificity.
Recommendations
EHRs and/or surgical information systems should be designed
to identify all patients undergoing target surgeries as well as
data required for patient-specific risk adjustment (eg, wound
class, surgery duration, antibiotic administration, basal met-
abolic index, and selected comorbidities). Billing codes (ICD-
9, ICD-10, and CPT codes) can be used to classify surgical
procedures into NHSN categories (mapping from available
codes to the CDC-defined codes is not trivial, but it is beyond
the scope of this white paper). Wound culture information,
antibiotic administration, readmission information, and ad-
ministrative codes are increasingly recommended for nu-
merator determination. For postdischarge surveillance, access
to EHR or claims data from physician outpatient offices
would be of great use. Additional work is needed to define
sensitive algorithms for electronically assisted surveillance
that optimize case finding while reducing the surveillance
burden.
validation
HAI surveillance has moved beyond the realm of hospital
quality improvement. With public reporting, HAI rates may
affect a hospital’s reputation, and with concomitant shifts in
reimbursement to “pay-for-performance” models, HAI rates
may also affect a hospital’s finances.30,31 Validation is the pro-
cess by which infection surveillance is vetted for quality.32 The
human element in “judging” infection is inherently variable
from person-to-person,33,34 and validation has traditionally
been focused on improving human reliability. In the current
context, it means that the products of electronic surveillance
(whether semi-automated electronic surveillance or fully au-
tomated electronic surveillance) are compared against a ref-
erence standard (usually manual surveillance, although po-
tentially an independent, fully automated surveillance could
also serve this role).
For the purpose of this white paper, validation can be
categorized into 2 types: internal validation, which refers to
self-assessment performed by the reporting facility itself, and
external validation, which refers to an assessment conducted
by an agency outside the facility (eg, health department).
Validation is an iterative process that should be repeated on
a scheduled basis, particularly when new databases or soft-
ware are implemented. The following internal and external
validation recommendations are adapted from the NHSN
Validation Guidance and Toolkit 2012.35 Both numerator and
denominator values will need validation, because these num-
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Microbiology cultures (blood and non-blood sites),
ADT, central venous catheter presence
Current definition requires judgment regarding the
origin of the blood pathogen
Catheter-associated uri-
nary tract infection
Microbiology cultures (urine only), urinalysis,
ADT, vital signs (fever), urinary catheter
presence
Current definition requires assessment of patient
symptoms
Surgical site infection Microbiology cultures (superficial or deep wound
cultures), procedure billing codes (eg, CPT
codes), hospital billing codes (eg, ICD-9), ADT
(to detect readmissions), antibiotic administra-
tion (optional)
Current definition requires judgment as to whether
infection occurred, since not all infections have a
positive culture; designation of depth of infec-
tion is often very nuanced
Ventilator-associated
event (VAC, IVAC)
Ventilator settings (PEEP, FiO2), presence of endo-
tracheal intubation device, ADT, antimicrobial
use, vital signs (temperature), laboratory (white
blood cell count), microbiology culture results
None
MDRO module Microbiology cultures, ADT None
Clostridium difficile
module
Microbiology (C. difficile), ADT None
note. ADT, admission/discharge/transfer system; CPT, current procedural therapy; FiO2, fraction inspired oxygen; ICD-9, International
Classification of Diseases, 9th Revision; IVAC, infection-related VAC; MDRO, multidrug-resistant organism; NHSN, National Healthcare
Safety Network; PEEP, positive expiratory end pressure; VAC, ventilator-associated condition.
bers will likely be gathered by different mechanisms. Table 1
summarizes key validation concepts.
Internal Validation
Denominator validation. The CDC-recommended approach
for denominator validation in facilities that electronically col-
lect such data is to ask the facility to validate that electronic
device counts are within 5% of manual counts.36 Such vali-
dation is required for 3 months at the beginning of electronic
count installation, and ongoing validation is recommended
for 1 month per year. To assist in this activity, electronic
surveillance systems should be able to produce “validation
reports” of device count data at a patient level, so that IPs
can review and troubleshoot discrepancies.
Numerator validation. IPs are asked to investigate all pos-
itive microbiologic cultures for possible HAIs. To facilitate
such review, electronic surveillance systems should be able to
produce a summary line listing of positive microbiologic cul-
tures by source type, stratified by location (eg, all blood cul-
tures from the intensive care unit [ICU] for 1 year). The
electronic system should then form the basis of a workflow
for the IPs to review each positive culture, document their
decisions, and generate summary reports. It is worth noting
that the optimal approach to numerator validation is not clear
for some types of hospital-acquired infections for which cul-
tures are sometimes negative or not performed (such as SSIs).
This will require future guidance from the CDC.
External Validation
Denominator validation. Electronic surveillance systems
should also be able to produce the data needed for external
validation activities.37-39 Most external validation currently fo-
cuses on numerator validation; denominator validation, if
performed by external auditors, would mirror the internal
validation efforts previously discussed.
Numerator validation. External auditors will typically re-
quest a list of all positive microbiologic culture results from
a specific source and location (eg, all positive blood culture
results from the ICU for 1 year). Auditors typically specify
that the information come directly from the primary source
of data (ie, laboratory information management system).
Usual fields required for such reports include (1) unique
laboratory accession number, (2) specimen collection date,
(3) primary organism genus and species identity, (4) speci-
men collection location (eg, medical ICU), (5) medical record
number, (6) first name, (7) last name, (8) patient birth date,
and (7) hospital admission date.
Of note, some laboratory information management sys-
tems continuously update the facility location field as a pa-
tient moves through a facility; thus, even if a blood sample
for culture is drawn in the medical ICU, if the patient is then
transferred to the medical ward, the facility location is
changed accordingly. Such dynamic location fields impair the
ability of microbiology laboratories to perform location-based
queries based on collection location. We recommend that
laboratory information systems retain the collection location
as a static data element that is distinct from a dynamic patient
“current location” field.
For semi-automated electronic surveillance, the current
reference standard is the determination by a trained auditor
using NHSN criteria. For fully automated electronic surveil-
lance systems, there is no established auditing system in place,
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although a manual verification of fully automated electronic
surveillance outcomes using raw microbiologic and ADT data
is a likely method of validation for the future.
Future validation efforts will likely add more advanced risk
adjustment and automated benchmarking to identify facilities
with potentially faulty surveillance. Future risk adjustment
may include external requests for patient-level data, such as
patient acuity of illness at the time of admission as well as
patient comorbidities. Future benchmarking may also include
either crude surrogates of device-related infections (eg,
device-independent nosocomial bacteremia rate as a bench-
mark for CLABSI) or more advanced algorithms that estimate
device-related infection rates based on probabilistic
modeling.40
discussion
Although still in the early stages, electronic surveillance for
HAIs is clearly here to stay. Indeed, the current NHSN LabID
surveillance for Clostridium difficile infections and MRSA bac-
teremia required by CMS can easily be implemented (and
often are) as fully automated electronic surveillance systems,
although they may not be recognized as such. One compelling
reason for transitioning from traditional manual surveillance
methods to fully automated electronic surveillance is that
traditional methods are susceptible to variability caused by
differences between IPs and hospitals in their intensity of
surveillance as well as individual biases in interpretation. Var-
iability and bias compromise reliability, and poor reliability
undermines the validity of interinstitutional comparisons.
Given the current environment, in which States are man-
dating reporting of infection rates to the public, valid inter-
institutional comparisons are essential. Although rigorous
training, episodic audits, and retraining make it theoretically
possible to achieve acceptable reliability, the manpower to
realize this level of performance across different device-
associated infections, in a wide array of different ICU types,
and across thousands of hospitals seems like an improbable
if not insurmountable task. Even with heroic efforts to im-
prove reliability, it seems that electronic rules and algorithms
will be more reliably applied across institutions, and even if
slightly less specific, such highly reliable systems can still be
superior for interinstitutional comparison of infection rates.41
Perhaps an even stronger incentive driving a transition to
fully automated electronic surveillance is the promise of re-
ducing the substantial amount of time required for an IP to
identify and categorize putative infections. From the hospital
perspective, allowing IPs to devote their time to implementing
and maintaining infection prevention interventions provides
more value to the institution than counting events.
There are several challenges and limitations of fully au-
tomated electronic surveillance. One limitation is that tra-
ditional methods allow for a deeper understanding of the
clinical context. However, if HAI rates are high in a given
area, additional investigation can provide such context; oth-
erwise, having this information adds little. A major challenge
is the considerable start-up and maintenance costs associated
with building interfaces to aggregate and organize raw clinical
data, analyze them for events of interest, and present them
to IPs in an actionable format. These costs are likely to di-
minish over time as hospitals increasingly adopt EHRs and
transform these records to meet meaningful use requirements.
As an infection prevention and control community, it is
time for us to embrace objective electronic definitions ame-
nable to fully automated surveillance. Table 2 lists current
NHSN surveillance measures along with elements needed to
shift toward electronic surveillance. Shifting to objective def-
initions and developing electronic systems to automate the
extraction, analysis, and presentation of these data not only
will make surveillance more efficient but holds the promise
of allowing us to direct ever more of our limited resources
toward preventing, rather than just counting, infections.
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